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IN THE SUPREME COURT
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BARBARA LYON,
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vs.
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND
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Defendam,t atnd .A.ppeUo;n,t,
and
YOSEMIT'E INSURANCE,
COMPANY,

==

Case No.

1a..•' f

Defevn,d,am,t.

BRIE'F OF PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-APPELLANT
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court
In and for Salt Lake C'ounty, Utah
The Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRIS:TENSEN
and HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor, Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendoot OJYtd .A.welloot.
HATCH McRAE
RlCHARDSON & KINGHORN
707 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Plaimtif f
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364-6474

November 10, 1970
L. M. Cummings
Clerk of the Supreme Court
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Barbara Lyon v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., et al
Case No. 12068

Dear Mr. Cummings:
Please add the following citations to the Respondent's brief on file
for argument this date:
POIN'T I
Moore v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 155 SE2d 128 (1967)
American Mutual Ins. Co. v. Romero, 10th Cir. Ct, 428 F.2d 870 (1970)
POINT II
In re Hutchison v. Hartford Insurance Co., NY s.ct.App. (not in
advance sheets up to 314 NY2d, Vol. 3), summarized in CCH Automobile Law
Reports #136, Aug. 28, 1970, page 3.
cc Harold G. Christensen
cc Burningham & Dee

Respectfully submitted

l.
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IN THE SUPRf:ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA LYON,

Plaintiff and Respondent_.
vs.

HARTFORD AiCCIDENT AND
INDEMNITY COMP ANY,

Defendant and Appellant,
and

Case No.

12068

YOSEMIT.E} INSURANCE
CO.MP ANY,

Defendant.

BRIJ~F

OF PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-APPELLANT
NATUR.E OF THE CASE

This is an action to recover against respondent's insurance company for her damages incurred by an uninrnred motorist. It is also a case of first impression in
this Court and in some respects in the United States.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent was granted a summary judgment
against appellant and defendant Yosemite, who did not
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appeal, by 'I1he Honorable Cordon R. Hall in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. Appellant appeal!:;
from the granting of a portion of the motion for summary judgment and respondent cross-appeals from tht'
denial of certain portions of said motion for summary
judgment.
RELIEF

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks to sustain the judgment of tht>
lower court insofar as the same was granted in her favor
and seeks a reversal of the lower ('OUrt denying judt,rment
on the points raised on cross-appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, Barbara Lyon, was injured while a
guest passenger in an automobile driven by one Bernie
:Jiartin('Z on F\,hrnci.ry -:. 1D; 9. .:\ eivil aetion was
brought against Scott Gould :Kickel, an uninsured motorist driver of one vehicle, and Robert G. Butcher, an insured motorist driver of a second vehiclt•, claiming that
each was jointly and S(:>Yerally liable to respondent for
the serious injuries she had suffered as a result of said
collision. Judgment was entered on a jury verdict
against both defendants on Angust 7, 1969, in the sum
of $70,0~~) 7G. See 1,Tol. I I t1f Lhe 1'ram:t•ript on Appeal
<'Ontaining the file of CiYil Ko. 18-1-99-1: 1Yhich is the civil
action in which the judgment was rendered. See also the
oxhihit envelope pertaining to that file as documentation
for the serious and }l('rmnrn"nt disfiguring injuries refo;pondent suffered as a result of ~ickel 's and Butcher's
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1wgligence. Prior to the trial date in the first civil action,
Butcher, through his insurance company, made an offer
of judgment for his policy lilllits (R. 222), which was
not accepted, and expired in accordance with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, as a result of the trial (R. 255).
The sum of $3,000.00 plus the cost bill of $51.90 was paid
to respondent, and the sum of $2,000.00, being the balance
of Allstate's liability, was paid to the Clerk of Salt Lake
County (R. 260), as a result of the filing of a complaint
in intervention for said sum by appellant on August 1,
1969, (R. 224), the $2,000.00 having been paid by appellant under its Medical Payments Provision of respondmt's own family automobile insurance policy (R. 1).
Hartford also had written a single limits Uninsured
l\lotorist clause insuring l\Iiss Lyon against this type loss,
the principle amount of which was $20,000.00. Yosemite
Insurance Company became involved in the instant civil
action because it was the insuring company for the vehide in which respondent was a guest passenger at the
time she received her injuries. Part of the coverage written on the automobile in which ~Iiss Lyon was riding included an rninsured ::\fotorists clause v.rith minimum
policy limits of $10/20,000.
After obtaining the above jury verdict, respondent
brought a direct civil action against Hartford and Yosemite for recovery of the sum of her damages as assessed
by the jury for which she had not been paid. After Judge

Hall granted to respondent a smmnary judgment (R.
125) from which this appeal arises, Yosemite paid the
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amount of the judgment aSSl'ssed by the lower court
against it and respondent accepted same as a partial comvromise settlement of her dai111 (R. 138). Hartford appealed and Barbara Lyon ernss-appealed.
Part of the record on appeal in this case includes
pleadings, a deposition and arguments of law on certain
requests for admissions of fact from the Plaintiff to the
insurance company defendants as to whether or not a
defense asserted by them that Nickel had a valid policy
of public liability insurnnre in force at the time of the
accident was a true fact. That issue \Vas resolved against
the insurance companies has not been raised on appeal,
and is, therefore, not now material to this case.
POINTS ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL
POINT I
THE LEGISLATURE HAVING ENACTED AN UNINSURED MOTORIST J,AW IN THIS STATE IN 1967, THE
FORMER RULE OF LAW OF THIS COURT IN RUSSELL VS.
POULSEN (1966), IS NOT APPLICABLE, AND RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ALL AVAILABLE UNINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE UP TO THE AMOUNT OF HER
ACTUAL GENERAL AND SPECIAL DAMAGES WHICH, IN
THIS CASE, INCLUDES THE $20,000.00 SINGLE LIMITS
POLICY WRITTEN BY APPELLANT.

Utah Code Annotated was enacted by
the 1967 Legislature. It requirrs sale of uninsured motorist coverage with automobile insurance unless expressly
rejected by the insured in writing. The policy in question
contains the following terminolobry :
~41-12-21.1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

1

5

"Protection against uninsured motorists: ThPcompauy ·will pay all smns which the insured or
his legal representative shall be legally entitled
to recover as damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily
injlll')' rnstained by the insured caused by accideu t arn1 arising out of the ownership maintenance or use of such uninsured highway vehicle ... "
(R. 42)
Hartford still includes as further terminology in its
policy a duty to arbitrate and to obtain its consent to sue
for a determination of liability and damages, which
elauses have heretofore been held invalid almost universally.
When .Hartford purports to agree to pay "all sums
which the insured ... shall be legally entitled to recover
... ," respondent submits that this is exactly what she
is asking for and has demanded that Hartford pay under
the Uninsured Motorists clause of its policy, specifically,
$20,000.00. Referring the Court to Russell v. Poulsen,
18 Utah 2d 157, 417 P. 2d 658 (1966), upon which appellant relies, we submit that the intent of the Legislature
in enacting the above statute now changes and overrides
llrnt decision. vYe further submit that what may then
have been the majority case rule as followed by this
Court in 1966 is now the minority rule in interpreting
in uninsured motorist cases the "other insurance" provisions relied upon by appellant. They are now being
invalidated whether th0 form be "prorata," "ex:cess insurance," or "excess-escape." \Ve further believe that
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the statement in 28 A.L.R. 3<l at 539 is the current trend
of the law:
''The following cases hold or recognize that
an 'other insurance' provision, whether in the
form of a 'pro rata,' 'excess insurance,' 'excessescape,' or other similar clause, as it has variously
appeared in the cases cited, is invalid, when contained in a policy providing protection against injuries caused by uninsured motorists, to deny,
within its general lii:iits, recovery of proper damages, on the ground that this type of provision
limits the protection afforded the insured in a
manner contrary to the policy behind statutes requiring insurers to provide uninsured motorist
coverage, and not limiting the tota.Z recovery
allowable by one sitff ering damages from am unin
insured motorist." (See cases cited, emphasis
added.)
Discussing Sellers 1'. United States Fidelity & Guarranty Company, ( 1966 Fla.), 185 So. 2d 869, the annotator above makes the following observation:
"There appeared to be no latitude in the statute, the court said, for an insurer to limit its liability through such 'other insurance' clauses, and
if the statute was to be meaningful and controlling
in respect to the nature and extent of the coverage, the sources of recovery, and the subrogation
of the insurer, all incom;i8tent clause::; in the policy must be judiciall>' rejected, although insured
would not be permitted to 'pyramid' recoveries."
(double recovery) 28 A.L.R. 3d p. 560.
Arizona, in Geyer v. Resen_;e Insurance Company
(1968), 447 P. 2d 556, 561 was called upon to inh•rpret
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its almost identieally vnhatim l'ninsured Motorist statuk enacted in 19G3. ln this ease the Arizona court eliminated an)' belief that lJl"Pviom; decisions might support
•Jie validity of "oiht'l' insurn11ce'' clauses and joined the
current trend of eases relied upon by respondent which
accumulate all available~ policies to aid in full and complde compensation of an injured person. Referring to
other Arizona decisions, the court stated in deciding for
tlie insured in a fact situation similar to Russell v. Poul·' '11, whose claim exceeded another company's limits:
"They (previous cases) indicate to us that
Arizona will nowhere but in the forefront of
jurisdictions in making available to automobile
accident victims the fullest extent of insurance
coverage . . . nothing in the nature of a constrained construction is required to hold that the
minimum limits of our uninsured motorist legislation are a part of every policy issued containing
such coverage, and the prescribed limits cannot be
reduced by off setting policy provisions.

* * *

mrhe apparent intent of the Legislature was
to provide for uninsured motorists coverage in
the stated minimum amount, unless the coverage
was rejected.

*

*

*

"We add, for emphasis, that all that has been
said herein is applicable only to the extent of the
total legal damages of the claimant. Nothing we
have stated in this opinion is to be construed as
permitting or tending to permit 'double recovery'
or windfall to the insured under separate coverages in exeess of her actual legal damages."
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IN vVIDDIS, 62 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Nmnber 4), page 497, at page
520, the author states:
"The policy creates an exclusion according to
which 'the insurance does not apply ... so as tu
inure directly or indiredly to the benefit of any
workman's compensation or disability carrier .. .'
In addition, the policy provides that any amount
payable under the terms of this insurance 'shall
be reduced by ... the amount paid and the present
value of all amounts payable ... under any workman's compensation law, disability benefits law or
any singular law,' and that the 'company shall not
be obligated to pay under this insurance that part
of the damages which the insured may be entitle<l
to recover ... which represents expenses for medical services paid or payable under the medical
payments coverage of the policy.' Adherence to
such provisions is certainly justifiable where the
available benefits exceed the damages sustained
by the insured. But where the actual damages
sustained are in excess of the dan1ages indemnified by either a workman's compensation plan or
the medical coverage of the insured's policy, the
uninsured motorist endorsement would still limit
the policy's protection making it unavailable to
supplement payments from these other sources.
Allowing the insured to recover up to the limits
of his policy, so long as he is not bevng comper1-sated twice, would be consistent with the principlP,
of indemnity, that the individual should not be
allowed to acheive a net gain through the receipt
of insurance proceeds from several sources. Several insurance companies, however, have taken advantage of a literal construction of these clauses
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to redu<.:e their liability belo\Y the limits of the
endorsement where the claimant received workman's compensation lJenefits, even though he was
not fully indemnified. In these instances, the
companies persuaded the courts that the endorsement's language is 'clear and unambiguous: and
that therefore the court had no right to make a
new contract for the parties. However, other
courts have invalidated this clause, finding such
clauses repugnant to the state's public policy as
manifested in the mandatory uninsured motorist
endorsement legislation. In those cases the insurer's obligation was held to be fixed and irreduceable regardless of what other sources of indemnification might be available to the insured-claimant. Rather than totally disregarding such
clauses, the better rule would be to interpret the
policy's terms so that the insured would be entitled to recover until he is fully indemnified, but
would not secure a multiple recovery through receipt of proceeds from the uninsured motorist endorsement. It would be more desirable to alter
the language of the standard endorsement to provide expressly for such coverage than to initiate
a state-by-state litigation process to determine
which state will accept the present limitation of
the standard policy." (Emphasis added).
Further illustration of this trend is found in the case
of Southeast Furniture Company and The State Insurance Fund v. Dean L. Barrett and The Industrial Comu~ission of Utah (1970) ______ Utah 2d ------, (1970) 465 P.2d
~46, wherein the Utah Justices unequivocally rejected an
argument that Uninsured Motorist contract benefits
eould be used to eliminate or reduce amounts due under
workmen's compensation benefits.
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Reference has been made by appellant to Martin v.
Christensen, 22 Utah 2d ±15, 454 P.2d 294 (1969). Tlw
facts of that case are unique in that one insurance company had issued two separate policies of insurance on
automobiles in the same household. Presumably there
was evidence of reduced premium because of the duplication of coverage and the policy provisions against accumulation of same.
Appellant fails to note to the court the entire text
of APPLEJJ1AN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, Volume 8, p. 400. The entire text is as follows:

"It has been held that where the owner of an
automobile or truck has a policy with an omnibus
clause, and the additional insured also has a nonownership policy which provides that it shall only
constitute excess coverage over and above any
other valid, collectible insurance, the owner's insurer has the primary liability. In such case, the
liability of the excess insurer does not arise until
the limits of the collectible insurance under the
primary policy have been exceeded. It should be
noted that under this rule, the courts give no application to the other insurance clause in the primary policy, which provides that if the additional
insured has other valid and collectible insurance,
he shall not be covered by the primary policy that
is because the insurance under the excess coverage
policy is not regarded as other collectible insurance, as it is not available to the insured until the
primary policy has been exhausted... "
We do not take issue with the brief excerpt appellant
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has cited to the court in National lndcninity Company v.
Lead Sitpplie~, Inc., 195 F. ~upp. 249, 255 (1960), being

a correct statement of ordinary contract law: however,
insurance policies are not so literally construed as noted
from a further excerpt from that opinion:
"Different factors and principles are involved
in those situations. Policies containing only 'pro
ra ta' clauses are in harmony and consonant with
each other in that each asserts, if multiple overlapping coverage exists, the same mathematical
computation for resolving the concurrent insurance problem. And if multiple 'excess' clauses
conflict or, as in the much-quoted case of Oregon
Automobile Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 9 Cir., 1952, 195 F. 2d 958, supra,
where an 'excess' clause conflicted with an 'escape'
clause, each insurer purported to disclaim responsibility if other coverage was available. If
such policies are to be construed and applied according to their terms, an intolerable situation
would be created. 'Escape' and 'exceRs' provisions
are indeed mutually repugnant to each other for
a resolution of the problem thereunder depends
upon which policy is read first. As the court in
Reeh v. W erch, supra, has observed, 'any attempt
to give effect to both clauses puts one on a perpetual mental merry-go-round.' 98 N.W. 2d at
page 926.''
Respondent submits that this Court should sustain
the conclusion of trial court as supported by the authorities cited which indicate that the legislative intent in enacting a mandatory Uninsured

~fotorist

Law was to af-
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ford compensation to lJL'rsons such as ~liss Lyon up to
the amount of her actual damages.
POINT II
SINCE

RESPOXDENT'~)

D_LiIAGES

EXCEED

ALL

AVAILABLE PUBLIC LIABILITY AXD l'XIXSGRED "JIOTORISTS INSURANCE, HARTFORD HAS XO RIGHT OF
SETOFF AGAINST THEIR "CXIXSURED J:OTORIST COYERAGE NOR A SUBROGATION RIGHT FOR THE $2,000.00
PAID BY THEl\I TO RESPONDENT.

41-12-21.1 L"tah Code ~\nnotated as amended by the
Chapter Laws of 1961, reads as follow::::
1Iotor yehicle liability policy - l-ninsured
motorist coyerage required. - Commencing on
July 1. 1964, no auto~nobile liability in:::urance policy insuring against loss resulting from liability
imposed by law for bodily injury or death or property damage suffered by any person arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or uses of a motor
Yehicle. shall be deliYered. issued for deli"\ery, or
renewed in this state. with respect to an:- motor
Yehide registered or principally garaged in thi;-;
state, unless coYerage is pro\ided in such policy
or a snpplemt•nt to it. in limits for bodily injury
or death set forth in section 41-1~-5. under proYisions filed with and appnn-ed by the state insuranL't' L'onu11issitn1 for the proteetion of persons
in:rnrt•d tht•remhler "-}w are legally entitled to reL't)n'r dmnages from L)wners or operators of uninsurt'd nwh)r ye}ricles ~rnd hit-and-run motor whides lwcause t)f bL)d~ly injury. sickness or disease.
indnding dt•ath. res:1lting therefrL)lll. Tht- named
illc'11rtd shall lwrl· tlit· ripli• f,; rt) l'i ~11ch c 11 rd-
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age, and unless the 11amed insured requests such
coverage in writing, such coverage need not be
proi·ided in a renewal policy or a supplement to
it where named insured had rejected the coverage
in connection with a policy previously issued to
him
the .-;ame in.surer. (Emphasis added).

uy

In support of respondent's motion for summary
j ndgrnent seeking to recover the $2,000.00 Medical Payments Coverage paid by Hartford to l\liss Lyon under
her own family automobile policy, which sum was paid
to the Clerk of Salt Lake County because of the contest
as to who was entitled to same, an affidavit was procured
from Mr. John T. Paradise, an examiner in the Utah
State Insurance Department ( R. 77). In substance, that
affidavit stated that Mr. Paradise was familiar with the
premium rate filings of all companies writing casualty
and property insurance policies in the State of Utah and
that Uninsured l\f otorists and Medical Payment Coverai:re are classified as casualty insurance. Further, the affidavit stated: "Defendants above-named, and all similar
l'tandard casualty insuring companies licensed in Utah,
have on file in the department in which I am employed
a fixed premium rate for Uninsured Motorists Coverage ... "
"Defendants above-named, and the above re-

f erred to standard easualty insuring companies,

do not reduce their premiums on Uninsured Motorists Coverage if the policy holder purchases
:Medical Payment Coverage."
Hartford's policy purports to reduce its liability to
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Miss Lyon, one of its narn0<l immreds, b)· the following
btatement in its policy:
'''l11w Company shall not bP obligated to pa~·
under CovL>rage D - l ~ ninsured l\lotorists that
part of tlw damag<·s whieh tht' insured may be entitled to reeover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured highway vehicle which represents expenses for medical services imid or payable undPr
Coverage B - .l\ledical I:1Jxpense." (R. 44).

In substance, what Hartford is trying to do is collect a full, non-flexible, Uninsured Motorist premium notwithstanding the prest•nce or absence of a contract for
}[edical Payments Coverage. This would constitute a
windfall to Hartford and is obviously against public policy. See Sims v. National CasitaUy Company, (Fla.
19(i5), 171 So. :.M 399: also 2-!- ..A.L.R. 3d 1353 for cases
discussing such a clause as being invalid as constituting
an attempt to reduce unimmred motorist liability below
statutory minimums.
Ht>re this ease di!'frrs from State Farm Mitf1t.al l11.rnnt11C<' Co»LJ)(lll.IJ i:. FarJ/lers !ns11ra11ce Exchange, ~:2
l'tah 183, -!-50 P.:Zd-!5.S (19()9), in that Miss Lyon's darnagt>s ('X('e>ed all availahl(• puhlic liability irnmranee:
Allstate (Butcher's company) $10,000.00, Yosemite
( ~lartinez's undPr thP omnibus dause, making his insuraJH'P appli('ahle to Miss Ly(m as a µ;nest passenger) $10,000.00, Hartford C~Iiss Lyon's O\\·n insuring company
under a single limit policy) $20,000.00.
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Public policy dictates that as between an insured and
nn insurer, if one is to receive a windfall it should be the
immred (although in view of the damages, there is no
windfall here) who has paid the fixed arbitrary premium
io insure against a certain loss. Notman, A Decennial
/-:tudy of the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, NOTRE
DA~II~ LA \VYER (October 1967) at page 16, see also
Stephe1l v. Allied Mutual Insi1;rance Company (Nebraska
1968), 156 N.W. 2d 133, wherein the court was construing
nn identical statute as became la-vv in that state in 1967,
1.:, set out at the beginning of this point. The Nebraska
eourt stated after discussing its fact situation involving
a judgment in excess of Uninsured Motorists Coverage
~nd Medical Payments Coverage, (page 136) :
"A provision, drawn by the insurer to comply
with the statutory requirement of uninsured motorist coverage, must be construed in light of thf•
purpose and policy of the statute. Such a provi:-ion, drawn in pursuance of a statutorily declared
public policy, is enacted for the benefit of injured
persons traveling on the public highways. Its purpose is to give the same protection to the person
injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have
had if he had been injured in an accident caused
by an automobile covered by a standard liability
policy. Such provisions are to be liberally construed to accomplish such purpose." (Citing
cases).

• • •

and at page 139 :
"The argument as to the effect of this provision, as distinguished from its basic nature, be-
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comes dieledically comvkx. If the provision does
not limit coverag<-', as the i1rnurer contends, \VP
fail to see its pnrpo~;''· ~-~urdy its object is not to
give additional covc•rage to the insured. Conversely, if its purpose is to alter or change thE'
company liability for tho separately charged premium for medical payments, it \\-ould have to bP
struck down as an alteration of the separately
contracted for contractual risk assumed by thP
insurer under the terms of the medical payment
coverage.

"The general rule is that an insurer may not
limit its liability un<ler uninsured motorist coverage by setoffs or limitations through 'other insurance,' excess insurance, or medical payment reduction clauses, and this is true even when the setoff for the reduction is claimed with respect to a
separate, independent policy of insurance (workmen's compensation) or other insured motorist
coverage. And this is true because the insured is
entitled to recover the same amount he would have
recovered if the offending motorist had maintained liability insurance." (Citing cases).
Respondent and cross-appellant submit that if this
Court believes its holding in State Farm Mutual v.

Fa·rmers is not against public policy, the rule of this jurisdiction should be confined to the fact situation of that
case and should not apply \\-hen damages exceed all available insurance coverage.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
POINT III
IF THE COURT CONCLUDES HARTFORD HAS A SUBROGATION RIGHT FOR THE $2,000.00 MEDICAL PAYMENTS MADE BY IT, THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
COURT GRANTING RESPONDENT AN ATTORNEYS' FEE
AW ARD FOR RECOVERING SAID SUl\1 ON BEHALF OF
HARTFORD IS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED

Appellant does not consider the record as a whole in
this case when, at page 10 of its brief, it is claimed that
llartford didn't accept the benefit of the efforts of plaintiff's counsel. By the time this case was tried ]n August
of 1969, a summary judgment for liability had already
hePn entered in May, 1969 (R. :HO). An offer of judgment was made on behalf of Butcher on June 19, 1969, for
t}w limit of his policy plns taxable costs (R. 222) and,
only thereafter, on .July 21 did appellant file a motion
and complaint in intervention (R 222 et sequitar). There
is no other evidence that Allstate \Vas willing to pay its
$10,000.00 policy limits until forced to trial, and, obviously, after not wanting to be caught in a position of bad
faith bargaining by their own insured, Robert G. Butcher.
Under basic quantum meruit principles, if Hartford
~l'riously

believes that it is entitled to reduce its liability

under its Uninsured Motorist Coverage, as heretofore
discussed in Point II, it seems unconscionable that they
should be permitted to idly accept the benefits, without
C'ost, of its insured's prosecution of a civil action to establish liability, amount of damages, recoupment of some
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of the damages, and then demand the benefits of
same by asserting its clairnPd subrogation right. In Stat{'
Farm vs. Fanncrs, supra, it is admitted this Court upheld the subrogation rig11t for uwdical payments madt>.
Presumably evidence must liavt> be(~n adduced, in addition
to mere contract interpretation, of some reduced premium factor in return for :mch provision, or underwriting considerations were taken into account by the insuring company in order to support the conclusion that such
a clause was not against public policy. \Ve submit if an
insurance company is attempting to contract itself into a
windfall by reducing its exposure as Hartford did herP
and still charges a full premium for an item of coverage
without regard to the reduced exposure, this is against
public policy. The windfall, if there is one, should be that
of the insured, not the insurer, and such clause should be
voided or, in the alternativP, an immred should equitably
he entitled to collect attorneys' fees for the recoupment.
Reference has been to the ease of Black vs. Black, 17
Utah 2d, 369, 412 P. 2d 45-t, for the proposition that attorneys' fees eannot lw taxt>d to assess same. That case
differs from the instant a\rard by Judge Hall which is
sustained by the following PXC('rpts from 45 A.L.R. 2d at
1186 and 1187 :

"It appears to he well settled that where the
natural and proximate consequence of a tortious
act of defendant has been to involve plaintiff in
litigation with a third person, reasonable compensation for attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiff
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in such action may be recovered as damages
against the author of the tortious act. All the
cases support either expressly or by necessary
implication this general principle:

• • •
"This is also the rule of the Restatement 8 ,
where it is stated that 'a person who through thf~
tort of another ha::; been required to act in the
protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to
recover compensation for the reasonably necessary los::; of time, attorney fees and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred.'
8

Restatement, Torts

~914."

Even though this is an action in contract to recover
under an insurance policy, plaintiff's action against appellant also lays in tort for intentional negligent breach
of said contract, and, therefore, the award of attorneys'
fees would be proper if the Court rules against respondent on Point II.
POINT IV
THIS BEING AN ACTION ON A CONTRACT BETWEEN
AN INSURED AND AN INSURER, RESPONDENT SHOULD
BE ENTITLED TO LEGAL INTEREST OF SIX PER CENT
PER ANNUM FROM THE DATE OF HER LOSS, FEBRUARY
4, 1969, - THE DATE SHE WAS INJURED, UNTIL AUGUST
7, 1969, WHEN JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED IN THE FIRST
CIVIL ACTION.

The only case the writer has been able to locate on
this point of cross-appeal is that of Standard Accident
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Insurance Company 1;::;, Gai:in, (Florida 1966), 184 So.
2d, 229, 2-± A.L.R ;)d 1;};)9. In that case the Florida court
stated:
·'The Court further· finds, over the objection
of the defendant that the plaintiff is entitled to
interest on the said sum of $20,000.00 from th<>
date of death of her husband. Although the damages sustained by the plaintiff arose by reason
of a tort commited by an uninsured motorist,
plaintiff's action against the defendant is an action on her contract of insurance with the defendant and is not an action sounding in tort. Accordingly, interest is due on the amount of damages
which plaintiff is entitled to recover under her
contract with defendant from the date said damages were sustained and became due and payable."
From an examination of the exhibit file of the original civil action, Civil No. lS-1-994 (Vol. II of the transcript on this appeal), a review of the photographic documentation received by the court in that civil action of
Miss Lyon's injuries, notice of the nature and extent of
which was served upon appt>llant before the August 1969
trial, (R. 208-9 and 11~xhihit P-7 in the instant appeal)
should beyond all <louht lui.w· plaePd appellant on notice
of ib:; legal obligation to pay and, therefore, interest
should be owed l\liss Lyon undt>r her contract.
POINT V
RESPONDENT HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
APPELLANT BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO BARGAIN
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WITH HER IN AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE HER INJURY
CLAIM WITHIN OR FOR THE AMOUNT OF APPELLANT'S
COVERAGE EXPOSURE WITHOUT THE NECCESSITY OF A
LAWSUIT, APPELLANT HAVING AT ALL TIMES BEEN ON
ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF RESPONDENT'S PERSONAL INJURIES, HER PERMANENT
DISFIGUREMENT AND THE SEVERITY OF SAME.

Exhibits P-3 through P-14 in this case were received
into evidence by the trial court in support of the docu1rn~ntation of notice to appellant of all stages of these pro<'eedings. An examination of the certificates of mailing
by respondent's counsel of copies of pleadings at all
stages of the proceedings is contained in Volume II of the
transcript in this appeal, which is the pleading file in the
original civil action. Hartford is in no position to assert
lack of notice of the nature and extent of Miss Lyon'~
permanent facial injuries. In fact, the motion for an immediate trial after a summary judgment for liability had
been granted, (R. 198 and 206), advised them that special
damages were approaching $10,000.00.
No case law has been located in the United States for
or against the proposition that an insurance company has
a duty to bargain with its insured to settle an uninsured
·motorist claim. In UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCIS.CO LAW REVIETV, Volmne Ill, page 46, is a discussion
of the problem and potential liability of an insuring coml>:tny under a fact situation similar to Barbara Lyon's.
TJw author's observations are as follows:
"FNINSURED

MOTORIST

INSURERS'
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LIAILITY FOll LEGAL EXPEN8ES THE INSURED INCURS lN" ARBITRATING HI 8
CLAIM. Assume that an insured car r i e : ;
$15,000.00 in uninsured motorist coverage. Assume further that an uninsured motorist injures
the insured so severly that if the case against the
motorist were litegated in a personal injmy
action, the insured would recover a $50,000 judgment. At this point, the insured would probably
consult an attorney. A competent attorney will
recognize that the insured's claim ·worth exceedi:;
the policy's limits. rrhe insured and the attorney
are likely to enter into the following retainer
agreement: (1) for a fee of $200.00, the attorney
promises to furnish the insurer with all the necessary documents and infom1ation to collect the
$15,000.00 face amount of the policy; and ( 2) the
attorney promises that if the insurer refuses to
pay the face amount of the policy he will prosecute the insured's claim on a contingent basis
for 331/s % of the award. Since the claim is an
uninsured motorist claim, the claim against the
insurer will be arbitrated. On these facts, the
arbitration award would be for $15,000.00 But
since the insured had to pay his attorney $5,000.00
rather than $200.00, the insurer's refusal to settle
cost the insured $4,800.00. Can the insured hold
the insurer liable for the $±,800.00 "?
"The answer to this question depends upon the
courts' willingness to analogize to the Crisci fact
situation." (Crisci, v. Security I nsttrance Company _ 426 P. 2d 173) (1967).

"It can be argued that the analogy to the Crisci fact situation is seriously defective. Superficially, there is a clear distinction between the two
situations. In the Crisci fact situation, the insur-
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er's refusal to settle re:::;ults in an excess judgment. It is true that where the uninsured motorist insurer refuses to settle the insured does not
suffer an excess judgment. On the other hand, the
uninsured motorist insurer's refusal to settle
causes the insured a definite financial loss. The
only uifierence between the two situations is the
way in which the insurer causes the insured a
financial loss. In the Crisci fact situation, the loss
occurs by way of legal expenses. In both cases,
the insurer's refusal to settle causes the insured a
financial Joss. If the uninsured motorist insurer's
refusal to settle is wrongful, it seems that the insurer :::;hould be held liable for the insur2d's legal
expenses. It is the opinion of this author that if
the case arises, a California court would analogize
to the Crisci case an<l hold the insurer liable for
the $4,800.00."
It is obvious that J'ifiss Lyon has been damaged and
should be compensated for same because of the refusal of
Hartford to even bargain with her. The file and all of
the evidence adduced up to the summary judgment proceedings from which this appeal arises does not diclose
one scintilla of evidence that Hartford at any time has
lJeen willing to bargain or settle their obligation to Miss
Lyon.

See R. 179, et sequitur, for stipulations on notice to
appellant and its agents and the failure to take any action
t0 determine its liability to Miss Lyon.

Tlw eourt's attention is directed to Andeen v. Country llhthwl !11surn11ce Com1J<1ny, :217 N.E. 2d 814. In that
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case the insurance company had written a $30,000.00 Un.
insured Motorists Policy. rrhey permitted a default
judgment to be entered against the uninsured motorist
defendant in the sum of $60,000.00. The Supreme Court,
in a dircet action suit against the insurance company,
held them liable for the total arnount of the default judgment. See also Potomac Insurance Company v. Wilkins
Company, 376 F. 2d 425, Tenth Circuit (1967), supporting the trend of authorities obligating insurance companiGs to bargain and represent their insureds' interests.
CONCLUSION
Respondent and cross-appellant respectfully submits
that she having purchased a policy of Uninsured Motorist Coverage with appellant in the sum $20,000.00, and
her damages having been assessed by a jury and exceeding liability and uninsured motorist insurance limits, the
judgment of The Honorable Gordon R. Hall awarding
her further compensation should be sustained. Likewise,
since a separate policy of medical payments insurance
was written and there is no possible double compensation
from insurance companies, it is against public policy to
permit reduction in liability because of offsetting insurance clauses in the same policy, especially when the only
evidence is no reduced premium factor was afforded her.
Should this court affirm the rationale of State Farm v.

Farmers as controlling, Hartford should not be permitted

to accept insurance premiums without assuming an oblig·ation to their insured and her attorney for recoupment
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of the subrogated amount. rl111i8 being an action based
upon a contract, legal intere::;t of six per cent ( 6%) per
annum should be owed from the date of the loss. Appellant having willfully and intentionally breached its contractual duty of compensation to Miss Lyon for damages
obviously due her in excess of Hartford and other insurance limits, this matter should be remanded for trial to
t>stablish the amount of damages sustained by her.
Respectfully submitted,

HATCH, McRAE,, RICHARD80N
& KINGHORN
By Robert M. McRae
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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